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1. Introduction
Anecdotal evidence shows that political scandals have important direct eﬀects on the
implicated politicians’ careers, as well as on broader aspects of governance in the aﬀected
jurisdiction. For instance, “Watergate” led to US President Richard Nixon’s resignation,
while the 2016 impeachment of Brazil’s ﬁrst female President Dilma Rousseﬀ caused
severe political instability at diﬀerent levels of governance. Academic research likewise
illustrates that voters punish corrupt incumbents in the poll booth, which lies at the heart
of elections’ role as a key accountability mechanism (Besley, 2006; Ashworth, 2012; Geys
and Mause, 2016).1 In this article, we provide evidence that political scandals also aﬀect
– and thereby trigger behavioural responses from – politicians not directly implicated by
the scandal.
Our central argument is that political scandals have implications beyond the politi-
cians directly involved because they can tarnish the party “brand” (Lupu, 2014).2 Party
names are often used by voters as low-cost, heuristic cues about the politicians asso-
ciated with these parties (Snyder and Ting, 2002, 2003; Geys and Vermeir, 2014, and
references therein). Party membership thus represents “one of the signals that voters use
when estimating the ‘quality’ of political representatives” (Jones and Hudson, 1998, p.
187), and can be of signiﬁcant value to politicians particularly when they are less known
to the broader public. Furthermore, parties provide beneﬁts to politicians in terms of
the organization of electoral campaigns, media coverage, career opportunities, and so
1For instance, Ferraz and Finan (2008) show that corrupt incumbents are punished in Brazilian
municipalities. In similar vein, Nannicini et al. (2013) ﬁnd that Italian deputies charged with criminal
oﬀences receive fewer votes at the next elections – though only in districts with high levels of social
capital. Interestingly, Chong et al. (2014) suggest that such electoral retribution might in some cases
also spill over to the challenger.
2One example concerns a scandal about the excessive rent-seeking activities of leading ﬁgures in
the socialist party in Brussels in 2017, which motivated other parties’ refusal to (continue to) coop-
erate with any members of this party in a coalition government (http://plus.lesoir.be/100409/
article/2017-06-19/le-cdh-ne-veut-plus-du-ps-quelles-coalitions-possibles). Highlight-
ing the damage to the party “brand”, the scandal also instigated an ‘Our hands are clean’ movement
among other members of the socialist party – both within Brussels and beyond ( http://www.lecho.
be/dossier/samusocial/Ceci-n-est-pas-une-fronde/9904273?ckc=1&ts=1501237145). Likewise,
the escalation of corruption scandals in Spain in 2013 strongly aﬀected popular perceptions of the in-
cumbent parties and contributed to the creation of new players in the political arena (i.e. Podemos and
Ciudadanos; https://elpais.com/elpais/2014/11/03/inenglish/1415011542_341454.html).
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on. However, when a party is hit by a political scandal, the value of being associated
– or even seeming to be associated – with that party declines dramatically. The party
name then no longer provides a simple cue towards the particular policy positions of this
party and its members (Wittman, 1989, 1995; Aldrich, 1995; Jones and Hudson, 1998),
but also triggers negative associations due to the political scandal. Rational politicians
weighing the costs and beneﬁts of their partisan aﬃliation will therefore reoptimize their
behaviour with respect to the desired level of association with the party.3
From a theoretical perspective, such reoptimization can take diﬀerent forms, and
thereby generates distinct empirically observable implications. First, when politicians
are members of the party involved in a scandal, breaking their association with the party
might involve resigning from their political oﬃce, leaving the party (e.g., by running as
an independent or switching to another party) or leaving politics altogether. Clearly,
leaving the party – or leaving politics – when their party is in power may cause it to lose
political support, which in turn can work to increase the probability of a government
crisis. Second, when the party involved in a scandal is part of the governing coalition,
its coalition partners may wish to break their association with the party by retracting
support for the government – again increasing the possibility of political deadlock and
government crisis (as in the cases of Brussels and Brazil mentioned earlier). This line
of argument leads to two empirically veriﬁable hypotheses. The ﬁrst is that rational
politicians withdraw support from parties involved in a scandal – thereby triggering
increased government instability. This may arise both due to politicians within the
scandal-hit party (since scandals are likely to undermine party discipline; Snyder and
Ting, 2002) and those outside it (because it becomes more complicated for the incumbent
to bargain for support; Tsebelis and Chang, 2004). The second hypothesis is that rational
politicians are likely to want to break – or, at the very least, limit – their personal ties to
parties involved in a scandal (e.g., by running as an independent or switching to another
party).
3While the exact mechanism leading scandals to reduce the party “brand” value is not central to our
argument, one can imagine at least three possible reasons: i) there might be a pure popularity eﬀect,
whereby voters are less likely to vote for politicians aﬃliated with a party tainted by a scandal (as an
expressive act); ii) voters might expect lower utility from politicians aﬃliated with a tainted party that
is losing inﬂuence (as an instrumental calculation); iii) politicians might expect reduced possibilities
for gaining power via aﬃliation with a tainted party. Whatever the underlying mechanism, one would
expect a drop in the utility politicians receive from the party brand.
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Our empirical analysis of these theoretical propositions studies the most famous po-
litical scandal in Italian modern history – generally referred to as Tangentopoli (literally:
“Bribe City”) or Mani Pulite (literally: “Clean Hands”) – which took place in the period
1992-1994. The scandal consisted of a vast and well-established system of corruption,
whereby public procurement contracts were assigned in exchange for illegal contributions
to political parties. All main political parties were involved in the scandal, but the two
leading national parties – the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Italian Socialist Party
(PSI) – were implicated most severely (more details below). While Tangentopoli repre-
sents a strong case of widespread corruption, establishing causal eﬀects of any scandal
on politicians’ behaviour is challenging, since endogeneity concerns are rarely avoidable.
From this perspective, it is crucial that the timing of Tangentopoli was unexpected by
local politicians, and that only very few local politicians were implicated. Hence, the
scandal provides an arguably exogenous information shock to local politicians about the
(relative) value of speciﬁc party brands, which we can exploit to provide a credible causal
estimate of politicians’ responses to a political scandal using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
(DiD) estimation strategy.
Our ﬁrst main ﬁnding is that a scandal taking place at the national level can induce
increased prevalence of government crises at the municipality level – as measured by local
governments’ early termination. We not only observe more local government crises in the
period 1992-1994, but show that such crises arose especially in municipalities ruled by the
parties most strongly implicated in Tangentopoli. This is consistent with our argument
that politicians retract support to local aﬃliates of the aﬀected parties (even though
these local aﬃliates have no direct involvement in the scandal) – causing increased local
government instability. Furthermore, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant support for the proposition that
politicians within the aﬀected parties’ local aﬃliates change their behaviour. They are
signiﬁcantly less likely to re-run in upcoming local elections (and less likely to be reelected
when they do), and signiﬁcantly more likely to switch their partisan aﬃliation towards
independent local parties. Interestingly, the latter proves to be a viable strategy since it
works to insulate these politicians at least partially from the electoral repercussions of
the scandal. Overall, therefore, our ﬁndings provide strong support for the notion that
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scandals are transmitted across politicians via partisan cues.4
Several extensions and robustness tests validate these central ﬁndings. First, we
show that the increase in local governments’ early terminations is most pronounced in
municipalities located in electoral districts with a higher number of national politicians
charged in the scandal. This conﬁrms that the disclosure of corruption news is a key
driver behind our results. Second, local political instability might in principle also be due
to local politicians directly implicated in Tangentopoli. We address this via a meticulous
investigation of local newspapers for a sample of about 1.100 municipalities (correspond-
ing to 18% of Italian municipalities). In municipalities governed by a party involved
in Tangentopoli at the national level, only 13% of government crises can be linked to
charged local politicians (compared to 25% in the remaining municipalities). Dropping
these municipalities from the sample leaves our ﬁndings unaﬀected.
Our analysis contributes to a number of literatures. First, while existing work has
shown that voters strongly respond to corruption scandals (Ferraz and Finan, 2008;
Nannicini et al., 2013; Chong et al., 2014; Cavalcanti et al., 2016), it has thus far failed
to analyse whether and how politicians react to information shocks arising from political
scandals. Our ﬁndings illustrate that politicians engage in meaningful adjustments of
their behaviour in light of the decreasing brand value of a party tainted by a corruption
scandal.5 This suggests that previous studies looking only at voters’ reactions might
pick up the overall response to a popularity shock (i.e., including the eﬀect of politicians’
reaction). Second, political alignment with the ruling party at the same or diﬀerent levels
of government has often been found to advance politicians’ ability to bring beneﬁts to
their constituency (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Albouy, 2013; Fouirnaies and
Mutlu-Eren, 2015; Fiva and Halse, 2016). We contribute to this literature on the role of
parties in politics by showing that corruption scandals can become transmitted across
politicians and levels of government through party “cues” (Snyder and Ting, 2002, 2003;
4Note that this is consistent with a large literature on organizational stigma illustrating that the
negative societal perception of speciﬁc social actors (e.g., men’s bathhouses and brothels, ﬁrms involved
in a bankruptcy or outlaw motorcycle clubs) often transfers onto individuals linked to, or aﬃliated
with, the stigmatized actor (e.g., clients, company directors or bikers) (Goﬀman, 1963; Kulik et al.,
2008; Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009; Kvale and Murdoch, 2017).
5Parties likewise appear to respond to negative popularity shocks. Cavalcanti et al. (2016), for
instance, analyze Brazilian local elections and show that the public exposure of corrupt incumbents
induces their parties to bring forward better-educated politicians during subsequent elections.
5
Geys and Vermeir, 2014). This testiﬁes to an important ‘dark side’ of partisan alignment
between politicians. Closely related, we provide the ﬁrst evidence that party switching
might be an eﬀective strategy for politicians hoping to retain voter support in light of a
scandal hitting their party. Finally, this paper is also linked to the literature on political
instability, which is generally considered an important obstacle to economic development
(Alesina et al., 1996). Our contribution here is to highlight that corruption scandals can
represent a source of short-term political instability, and as such might aﬀect the longer-
term development path of a country, region or municipality.
In the next section, we describe the Italian institutional framework and the main
events of the Tangentopoli scandal. Then, section 3 reports on our estimation strat-
egy and main ﬁndings, while section 4 presents several robustness checks. Section 5
concludes.
2. Institutional background
2.1. Italian politics before Tangentopoli
After the end of World War II, Italy introduced a bicameral government system. In
the lower chamber (“Camera”), elections were organized in 32 electoral districts. Seats
within each district were allocated to parties based on their vote share, and within each
party the candidates with the highest number of votes were elected. For the upper
chamber (“Senato”), elections were held in 20 regional districts, which were themselves
subdivided into single-member constituencies. If a candidate received 65% of the vote,
(s)he was elected. If no candidate reached this threshold (which was most often the
case), votes were grouped by party list at the regional level and used to allocate seats
across parties using a method similar to the one for the lower chamber.
At the local level, Italy’s roughly 8,000 municipalities were likewise governed using
a parliamentary system with a legislative branch (“Consiglio”, or local council) and an
executive branch (“Giunta”, or local government). In bigger municipalities (i.e. above
30.000 inhabitants), voters voted for party lists and could also express preferences for
individual candidates. Seats were allocated proportionally to parties, and within each
party were assigned to the candidates with most votes. In smaller cities, citizens voted
directly for council candidates, which were elected in order of their vote tallies. In both
cases, the mayor was subsequently appointed by the local council using a (qualiﬁed)
majority vote. That is, a two-thirds majority of councillors was necessary to elect the
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mayor in the ﬁrst two voting rounds, but a simple majority was suﬃcient during a third
(or later) round.
Before Tangentopoli, the national and local political arenas in Italy were dominated
by three political parties: Christian Democrats (DC), Italian Communist Party (PCI)
and Italian Socialist Party (PSI). These received, respectively, 34%, 26% and 14% of
the votes in the last national election prior to Tangentopoli (i.e. in 1987). A coalition
government was established between DC and PSI, with the support of three minor parties
(i.e. Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI), Italian Liberal Party (PLI) and Italian
Republican Party (PRI)). PCI was the main opposition party, although it split into two
parties (i.e. Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and Communist Refoundation Party
(PRC)) following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc in 1991. DC also was the dominating
party at the local level. In 1991, for instance, it held the mayor position in about 50%
of Italian municipalities. Figure 1 shows that despite a clear predominance of PCI in
central Italy, the three main political parties are represented in municipalities across all
regions.
Figure 1 about here
2.2. A brief history of Tangentopoli
Investigations into what became the largest political scandal in Italian modern history
started in Milan in February 1992. Within a few weeks, and largely thanks to the
deposition of a prominent politician of the Italian Socialist Party (Mario Chiesa), a
vast system of corruption was uncovered whereby public procurement contracts were
allocated in exchange for bribes to the ruling parties. These bribes were then generally
managed by the party’s headquarters for vote-buying activities (Newell, 2000). Parallel
investigations were soon set up in every Italian region and within months hundreds of
politicians, entrepreneurs and public oﬃcials had been charged with corruption (Gundle
and Parker, 1996). At the end of 1994, no less than 23% of the Italian national deputies
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had been charged with corruption or related activities.6 While 19 out of 20 regions saw
politicians being charged with corruptive practices, the regions with the largest number of
charged politicians were Campania (Naples), Lazio (Rome), Lombardia (Milan), Sicily
(Palermo) and Veneto (Venice). This closely matches the distribution of the Italian
population, as those ﬁve regions are the biggest in terms of population and, in turn,
elected deputies.
Important for our identiﬁcation strategy below, the scandal involved predominantly
politicians from the two main ruling parties (DC and PSI). This is illustrated in Figure
2, which shows the distribution of charged politicians by year and political party. This
ﬁgure clearly indicates that the peak of the corruption scandal was reached in 1993.
The number of charged politicians sharply declined in 1994 and only one politician was
charged in 1995 (not in the graph). More importantly, the ﬁgure indicates that 75% of
the charged politicians belong to the two main ruling parties. An additional 13% were
members of the minor parties in the government coalition (the category “Other gov.”
in Figure 2), and only 4% of the charged politicians was elected in the left-wing block.
The remaining ones were distributed across other minor parties. Interestingly, while the
Communist PCI generally supported the investigations, DC and PSI repeatedly tried to
block them arguing that members of parliament beneﬁt from Parliamentary immunity.
Ultimately, such eﬀorts were not successful, in part because high popular support and
constant media attention allowed the courts to continue their investigations. Even so,
this provides further illustration that DC and PSI were most strongly implicated, while
PCI was more marginally hit by the scandal.
Figure 2 about here
During the national elections of June 1992 – i.e. just after the start of Tangentopoli
– DC and PSI lost some electoral support, but maintained suﬃcient seats again to
form a coalition government (with support from the Italian Liberal Party (PLI) and the
6This number is based on our calculations using data from Ceron and Mainenti (2015). This source
provides comprehensive information on politicians in the Italian Chamber of Deputies charged with any
type of criminal behaviour. The data include the type of charge (including corruption, misappropriation,
abuse of power, as well as illegal party funding), the year in which the politician was charged, as well as
the deputy’s party aﬃliation and election district (for further details, see Ceron and Mainenti, 2015).
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Italian Social-Democratic Party (PSDI)). In these elections, the two parties arising from
the dissolved PCI (i.e. PDS and PRC) jointly received 21% of the votes in the lower
chamber and 23% in the upper chamber. Over the next 18 months the number of charged
politicians rapidly increased (as shown in Figure 2), and a new national electoral law –
based on majoritarian rule – was approved by referendum in 1993 (Gundle and Parker,
1996; Newell, 2000).7 DC – which had been ruling Italy uninterruptedly for almost ﬁfty
years – was disbanded in 1994, and national elections held that same year saw PSI nearly
completely lose its electoral support. Starting from 1992, DC and PSI also rapidly lost
control of municipal councils, and were replaced by new emerging parties (i.e. Forza
Italia and the Northern League) and especially by Civic Parties.8 The institutional
shock was so dramatic that historians deﬁne this period as the end of the Italian First
Republic.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Identiﬁcation strategy and empirical methodology
Assessing politicians’ responses to a political scandal via a simple comparison of juris-
dictions with and without scandals imposes several identiﬁcation issues. First, omitted
variables including political and economic conditions may aﬀect both the probability of
a scandal occurring and outcomes such as government instability or politicians’ decision
to re-run in upcoming elections. Second, political instability might also trigger scandals
when those in power increase rent extraction to compensate for the expected decrease
in future earnings. Third, we are particularly interested in the response to scandals
of politicians not themselves implicated in this scandal (those implicated will naturally
respond to this event). Yet, it is hard to guarantee politicians’ lack of involvement when
a scandal arises within their jurisdiction.
Our identiﬁcation strategy therefore takes advantage of three important character-
istics of the scandal as well as the Italian institutional and political framework. First,
7A new electoral law was also implemented at the local level. It introduced the direct election of the
mayor and a majority premium for the winner (more details in Geys, 2017). This does not aﬀect our
identiﬁcation strategy below as we focus on local governments elected prior to the start of Tangentopoli.
8Such Civic Parties are political parties with a local organization based on a local leader, but without
any regional or national party aﬃliation. Although Civic Parties were already active at the local level
prior to Tangentopoli, their popularity increased drastically after 1992.
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as mentioned, Tangentopoli predominantly implicated national-level politicians, and its
timing was unexpected for local politicians. This makes the scandal exogenous to local
politics, which signiﬁcantly mitigates the above-mentioned endogeneity concerns when
analyzing local instead of national politicians (we return to this in more detail below).
Second, many Italian parties are active at both the national and local level, though not
all local parties are linked to national parties. This provides variation in the degree to
which local oﬃce-holders – including incumbent mayors and aldermen – were aﬃliated
to the national parties involved in Tangentopoli. Hence, we can exploit the presence
of partisan connections between certain subsets of politicians (Snyder and Ting, 2002,
2003; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Geys and Vermeir, 2014; Fiva and Halse,
2016) to study local-level implications of a scandal taking place at the national level.
Finally, although the length of the electoral cycle is the same across all municipalities
(i.e. ﬁve years), not all municipalities hold elections at the same time. This allows us to
separate common time trends from the eﬀects under investigation (Dahlberg and Mörk,
2011).
These three characteristics provide an opportunity to address our theoretical proposi-
tions outlined in the introduction using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences research strategy. For-
mally, to assess the eﬀect of Tangentopoli on local government instability, we compare
local governments’ early termination before/after Tangentopoli depending on whether
or not the local incumbent’s party (though not the local incumbent, see also section 4
below) was aﬀected by the scandal. We thereby run the following regression model (with
subscripts i and t denoting municipalities and years, respectively):
Instabilityit = δi+β1 DC/PSIit×After Scandalt+β2 DC/PSIit+β3 After Scandalt+λt+it
(1)
Our dependent variable Instabilityit is a dummy equal to 1 when the government
in municipality i experiences early termination in year t (for a similar approach, see
Gagliarducci and Paserman, 2011). Since the electoral term was equal to ﬁve years
for all Italian municipalities in the period of interest, Instabilityit equals 1 when the
municipality had elections before this ﬁve-year term was completed (0 otherwise). This is
determined using annual data about local elected oﬃcials, which are publicly available on
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the website of the Italian Ministry of Interior. In our period of observation (1989-1994),
there were 1094 early government terminations in Italian municipalities. According to
the Ministry of Interior, this was most often due to the resignation of more than 50% of
the councillors (65% of early terminations), which reﬂects the fact that resignation is a
councillor’s main way to fully withdraw support for the local incumbent.9
While AfterScandal is equal to 1 in our treatment period (i.e. 1992-1994) and 0
in the period prior to Tangentopoli (i.e. 1989-1991), DC/PSIit is an indicator variable
equal to 1 when the mayor is aﬃliated to a national party implicated in the scandal.
Based on the discussion in the previous section, DC and PSI are deﬁned as ‘treated’
by the scandal. The three minor parties in the national government coalition prior to
Tangentopoli (i.e. PRI, PLI and PSDI) are also included in the treated group. Our key
parameter of interest is the coeﬃcient for the interaction between these two variables (β1),
which reﬂects the diﬀerential impact of the scandal on the stability of local governments
depending on the mayors’ partisan aﬃliation. We also include a full set of municipality
ﬁxed eﬀects (δi) and year ﬁxed eﬀects (λt), and cluster the error term at the municipality
level.10 Summary statistics for all relevant variables are provided in Table A.1 in the
appendix.
3.2. Results for local government instability
To concentrate as narrowly as possible on the period of the scandal, our empirical
analysis is based on local political data in the period 1989-1994 (where the window 1992-
1994 represents the years of Tangentopoli). We start our observation period in 1989 since
this is the ﬁrst year for which we can determine early local government terminations.
To provide a ﬁrst look at the data, Figure 3 reports the share of local governments
9Before 1993, municipalities would face early elections if: i) more than 50% of the councillors re-
signed; ii) the local budget was not approved on time; or iii) the national government removed the local
government (e.g., due to suspicion of inﬂuence from organized crime; Daniele and Geys, 2015; Galletta,
2017). From 1993 onwards, and due to the direct election of mayors under the new electoral rules (see
above), municipal governments could collapse also when: i) the mayor resigned or died, or ii) the coun-
cillors voted for the mayor’s impeachment. Given that this electoral system change was implemented
in all municipalities at the same time, it does not aﬀect our identiﬁcation strategy.
10Note that the sample only includes municipalities whose government was installed prior to Tangen-
topoli (i.e. before 1992). Municipalities facing early termination of their government in year t thus are
dropped from the sample in subsequent years. The reason is that the new ruling coalition would be
endogenous to our treatment.
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facing early termination for each year in the 1989-1994 period separated by the partisan
aﬃliation of the mayor: i) DC and PSI (in the two top panels), ii) PCI (or its successors
PDS and PRC after 1991) in the bottom left panel; and iii) Civic Parties and other
minor parties unaﬀected by the scandal in the bottom right panel. Figure 3 indicates
that early government dissolution was relatively rare prior to Tangentopoli, but jumped
across the board in 1991. More interestingly, Figure 3 also displays a strong increase in
early government dissolutions in the period 1992-1994 among municipalities governed by
a mayor aﬃliated to the main parties implicated in the national scandal (DC and PSI)
– whereas no similar surge is observed for municipalities governed by Civic Parties. (For
the data underlying this graphical representation, see Table A.2 in the appendix.)
Figure 3 about here
Table 1 looks at this observation in more detail by presenting the results from esti-
mating equation (1). The columns in Table 1 diﬀer only in terms of the ‘control’ group
employed. In columns (1) and (2), we compare municipalities with DC/PSI mayors (i.e.
the treated group) to all other municipalities. Instead, column (3) only includes munic-
ipalities with a mayor from the national opposition party (PCI) in the control group,
whereas the control group in columns (4) and (5) includes only municipalities where
the mayor was from another party (mainly Civic Parties and minor national opposition
parties). We follow this approach because even though the scandal predominantly im-
plicated DC and PSI, its eﬀect could have been strong enough to spill over to the other
main national party (PCI) (see, for instance, Chong et al., 2014).
Table 1 about here
Table 1 conﬁrms that local government instability increases during a national cor-
ruption scandal in municipalities ruled by parties hit by the corruption scandal, i.e. DC
and PSI. This is true whether we control for municipality, time and year-of-election ﬁxed
eﬀects (in column (2)) or not (in column (1)).11 The size of the estimated eﬀect is sub-
stantial, considering that the average yearly probability of early government termination
11The inclusion of year-of-election ﬁxed eﬀects controls for potential within-term heterogeneity in the
early termination probability (Becher and Christiansen, 2015).
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is 1.1%. Column (1), for instance, predicts an increase probability of local government
instability of 0.6% per year. These ﬁndings are consistent with the idea that politicians
at the local level withdraw support from incumbents aﬃliated to the aﬀected parties.
Columns (3) and (4) indicate that the exact nature of the control group matters. Local
government instability in treated municipalities increases during Tangentopoli particu-
larly relative to the control group of municipalities governed by Civic Parties (column
(4)), but not relative to municipalities governed by the Communist CPI (column (3)).
This suggests that Tangentopoli is likely to have induced some spillover eﬀect onto all
main national parties (Chong et al., 2014). Column (5) conﬁrms this by illustrating that
local government instability also increased in municipalities with PCI mayors relative
to the control group of municipalities with Civic Party mayors. Overall, therefore, the
results in Table 1 provide strong conﬁrmation that the national Tangentopoli scandal
induced increased local government instability in municipalities where the incumbent
had partisan ties to the implicated parties.12
Clearly, the causal interpretation of β1 relies on the assumption that treated and
untreated municipalities would have followed the same trend if the scandal had not
occurred (i.e. common trends assumption). To test this assumption, we run a more
general version of equation (1) replacing AfterScandal with a set of indicator variables
for each year in our observation period (except 1991, which is employed as the reference
category). This not only allows to capture the temporal dynamics of the eﬀect of the
scandal (in years 1992, 1993 and 1994), but also assesses whether municipalities governed
by diﬀerent parties had a similar likelihood of facing early government termination before
the occurrence of the scandal (i.e. in years 1989 and 1990). Figure 4 provides a graphical
representation of the results (see Table A.3 in the Appendix for the detailed regression
results). The top panel employs municipalities with PCI mayors as the control group,
while the bottom panel employs municipalities with Civic Party mayors as the control
12Table A.4 in Appendix A suggests that the observed eﬀects are stronger for DC than PSI. This is
consistent with the fact that DC was the strongest national party at the time of the scandal, and had
more politicians implicated in the scandal. Even so, it is important to point out that this increased
instability in municipalities with DC/PSI mayors is not due to the resignation of local councillors
resigning to ﬁll political vacancies at the national level. The reason is that few such vacancies opened
up as the scandal had little immediate impact on the number of MPs that resigned. In fact, only 14, 8
and 4 MPs resigned in 1992, 1993 and 1994, respectively (compared to 16 MPs in 1991 and 14 MPs in
1992).
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group. We ﬁnd no evidence of statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects prior to Tangentopoli in
either panel, which suggests that pre-trends are not driving our ﬁndings in Table 1.
Figure 4 about here
Our interpretation of the results presented thus far builds on the assumption that
Tangentopoli is the main driver of local political instability in the period 1992-1994.
However, Italy also suﬀered a severe economic crisis in this period, such that discontent
towards the ruling parties at the national level (DC and PSI) might have been due to the
poor performance of the Italian economy. To rule out this alternative interpretation, we
test for heterogeneous eﬀects of the scandal in two dimensions: i.e. the level of corruption
and the extent of local political competition. One would expect that Tangentopoli has
stronger eﬀects on local government instability when i) there are more extensive corrup-
tion revelations in the municipality’s electoral district (which sends a stronger negative
signal about the parties involved), and ii) the level of political competition in the mu-
nicipality is higher (which puts the local incumbent in a weaker political position). In
both cases, the empirical model in equation (1) is extended with a three-way interaction
between AfterScandal, DC/PSIit and measures of corruption or electoral competition.
We operationalize the level of corruption by looking at both the number and share of
national politicians charged with corruption in the electoral district of a municipality.
We thereby deﬁne an indicator variable High corruption equal to 1 when the number
(or share) of national politicians charged with corruption in the electoral district of a
municipality is above the median of the sample distribution. Electoral competition is
operationalized either statically via the political fragmentation of the local council (i.e.
the number of parties represented in the council) or dynamically via the presence of at
least one change in the political colour of the mayor in the period 1985-1991 (see also
Ashworth et al., 2014). The results are presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.13
Tables 2 and 3 about here
13Unfortunately, we are unable to exploit alternative measures of electoral competition – such as the
closeness of local elections – since local electoral data are available only from 1993 onwards.
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The results in Table 2 show a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the three-way
interaction when the control group consists of all other municipalities (columns (1) and
(4)) or municipalities where the mayor was from Civic Parties or minor national oppo-
sition parties (columns (3) and (6)). Its positive sign conﬁrms that the eﬀect on local
government instability observed before is stronger for municipalities situated in electoral
districts where more (or a larger share of) national deputies were charged with corruption
– and where the value of the party brand arguably declines most. The results in Table
3 similarly indicate that local government instability increases particularly in treated
municipalities that have more politically fragmented councils and are more electorally
competitive. Local incumbents in an already weaker political position thus are found to
be particularly sensitive to the decline in party brand value due to Tangentopoli. Taken
together, both sets of ﬁndings strongly suggest that Tangentopoli is the main driver of
the observed increase in local political instability.
3.3. Mechanisms: A focus on local politicians
The results in the previous section credibly link Tangentopoli to increased local gov-
ernment instability via politicians’ partisan connections. Given that most cases of early
government termination at the local level are due to councillor resignations (see above),
this also provides suggestive evidence for the idea that local politicians withdraw their
support for incumbents from implicated parties.14 Yet, our results thus far cannot di-
rectly assess local politicians’ strategic reoptimization of their aﬃliation with a tainted
party. In this section, we explore this mechanism in more detail by evaluating whether
politicians in parties hit by the scandal exhibit higher rates of party switching and lower
re-running and reelection rates. As a ﬁrst step, we consider all politicians elected in
Italian municipalities between 1985 and 1992, and test whether their probability of be-
ing reelected or switching parties during subsequent electoral rounds varies depending
on their party of aﬃliation. We expect reduced reelection rates and increased party
14Clearly, councillor resignations that force early elections need not (only) reﬂect a desire to distance
oneself from the scandal-hit party. Politicians may also want to capitalize on this party’s sudden electoral
disadvantage. Still, this line of argument is not inconsistent with our basic proposition that politicians’
partisan aﬃliations cause political scandals to have implications beyond the politicians directly involved.
Indeed, it likewise implies that party brands cause corruption scandals to spill over across politicians
and levels of government. We are grateful to Stephane Wolton for pointing this out to us.
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switching rates for politicians initially on a DC or PSI list after Tangentopoli.15 The
results are reported in Figure 5 and Table A.6 in the Appendix.
Figure 5 about here
Figure 5 and Table A.6 show that both the probability of switching party and the
probability of being reelected change for DC/PSI politicians from 1992 onwards. Specif-
ically, they become signiﬁcantly less likely to be reelected and more likely to switch
party (conditional on being reelected). Importantly, we do not observe any diﬀerential
pre-trends for either variable before the scandal erupted in 1992.
Figure 6 further examines the extent to which politicians historically running on a
DC or PSI ticket switched to other parties in the local elections of 1991, 1993 and 1995.
As above, the analysis starts from the complete set of politicians elected in the year
indicated at the top of each plot. Then, we check whether they also held elected oﬃce
in the period immediately prior to this election and, if so, for which party. Each panel
in Figure 6 contains the subset of politicians elected in year t aﬃliated to DC/PSI (or
its successors) in the recent past.16 Hence, the left-hand side of each panel – ‘party of
origin’ – is always 100%, which reﬂects that all politicians in each sample were elected
for DC/PSI (or its successors) in the period immediately preceding the election. The
right-hand side of each panel indicates the parties for which this set of politicians is
elected in year t (i.e., ‘party of destination’, which can but need not be the same as the
party of origin). A disparity between the party of origin (i.e. DC/PSI) and destination
naturally reﬂects party switching.
Figure 6 about here
The results in Figure 6 indicate that few DC/PSI politicians switched party in the
1991 elections. In fact, approximately 90% of those holding local oﬃce for DC/PSI
15While politicians may also switch party between elections, our data unfortunately only provide
politicians’ partisan aﬃliation at the time of local elections. As such, we can only observe party switching
around elections.
16As discussed in more detail in Section 4.2, DC and PSI were both dissolved at diﬀerent points in
time throughout 1994. Therefore, in 1995 we consider as DC/PSI aﬃliated those politicians who joined
parties that were widely perceived as the immediate successors of DC/PSI.
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immediately prior to the 1991 elections were also elected for these same parties during
these elections. This picture changes dramatically in the aftermath of Tangentopoli.
Almost half of the local politicians holding oﬃce for DC/PSI immediately prior to 1993
were elected under a diﬀerent party label in the 1993 elections. During the 1995 elections,
only 25% of local DC/PSI politicians remained faithful to the party (or its immediate
successors) for which they had previously been elected. Party switching thus became an
overwhelmingly common event for local DC/PSI politicians. In most cases, politicians
thereby moved towards Civic Parties and – though to a substantially lesser extent – new
right-wing parties. Figure A.1 in the online appendix indicates that the extent of party
switching shows a less dramatic increase after Tangentopoli when the party of origin was
PCI. Moreover, party switching actually became less likely over time – particularly in the
direction of DC/PSI – when the party of origin was Civic Parties. This strengthens our
interpretation that the party switching observed in Figure 6 is triggered by the decline
in the party brand value of DC and PSI after the scandal hit. We return to the electoral
value of such party switching to politicians below.
A clear caveat of the above analysis is that we cannot distinguish whether DC/PSI
politicians might be less likely to re-rerun after the scandal (e.g., due to expecting an
electoral punishment) and/or might be less likely to be receive votes due to the scandal.17
To disentangle these two possibilities, we match information about all locally elected
politicians since 1985 with information on mayoral elections in the period 1993-1995
(remember that direct mayoral elections were only introduced in 1993). This allows us
to identify all mayors and mayoral candidates – as well as their party aﬃliations prior
to Tangentopoli – which we can use to evaluate re-running rates and party switching
more directly. Table 4 analyses the decision of mayors in oﬃce prior to 1993 to stand
for reelection in the period 1993-1995. The dependent variable is an indicator variable
equal to 1 when the mayor stands for reelection (0 otherwise), and the main independent
variable refers to the mayor’s partisan aﬃliation during the previous legislative term. The
results in Table 4 indicate that mayors previously elected on a DC/PSI ticket are less
likely to stand for reelection in the 1993-1995 period, while the reverse holds for mayors
17The reason is that we lack data on election candidates. For council members disappearing from
our sample over time, we thus cannot know whether they did not stand for reelection or simply failed
to become reelected. Hence, for those not reelected we also cannot know on which party list they may
have featured.
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from Civic Parties. The point estimates suggest that DC/PSI mayors are approximately
8% less likely to stand for reelection immediately after Tangentopoli compared to mayors
from other parties. Roughly symmetrically, mayors from Civic Parties are almost 10%
more likely than other mayors to stand for reelection. These ﬁndings hold even after
controlling for year dummies (columns (1) and (3)) and individual covariates (columns
(2) and (4)).
Table 4 about here
Finally, one can wonder whether it is really necessary for local politicians to distance
themselves from a party that becomes entangled in a scandal at the national level. Does
it aﬀect a mayor’s chance of reelection if she continues to run under the now tainted party
label, and would electoral retribution be lower when switching to another party? These
questions are addressed in table 5, where we analyze local mayors’ reelection probability
depending on their party aﬃliation. The dependent variable equals 1 when a mayor is
reelected (conditional on having stood for reelection) in the 1993-1995 period and 0 when
she stands for reelection but fails to regain the mayor position. As in the previous table,
the main independent variable in the ﬁrst four columns refers to the mayor’s partisan
aﬃliation during the previous legislative term. In columns (5) and (6), we furthermore
add an interaction term between the mayor’s party aﬃliation in the previous term and her
aﬃliation to a Civic Party list in the current election (Civicpartiest+1). This interaction
captures whether – and to what extent – switching from DC/PSI to a Civic Party list
can insulate a mayor from electoral retribution when her original party is entangled in
a major scandal at the national level.
Table 5 about here
Columns (1) and (2) in table 5 indicate that mayors running for reelection in the 1993-
1995 period on a DC/PSI party label are signiﬁcantly less likely to be reelected. The
point estimates suggest a decrease in their probability of reelection with approximately
10% compared to mayors from other parties, which is roughly 25% of the standard devi-
ation in mayors’ reelection probability. This is substantively meaningful also given that
the overall probability of reelection is just over 75%. Columns (3) and (4) indicate that
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Civic Party mayors have a 4% to 5% higher probability of reelection in the 1993-1995 pe-
riod compared to mayors from other parties. Interestingly, columns (5) and (6) illustrate
that switching party from DC/PSI to a Civic Party list can provide partial insulation
from the electoral cost associated with the tainted DC/PSI party label. Whereas the
reelection probability of DC/PSI mayors that do not switch party is 15% to 17% lower
compared to mayors from other parties in the 1993-1995 period, DC/PSI mayors that
did switch to a Civic Party list are only 6% to 7% less likely to be reelected than may-
ors from other parties. Strategically dissociating oneself from a party implicated in a
national scandal thus appears highly beneﬁcial.
4. Further robustness checks
4.1. The role of local corruption
As mentioned above, our identiﬁcation requires that local politicians were not them-
selves implicated in the Tangentopoli scandal. To the extent that municipal politicians
were charged with corruption, our ﬁndings may simply reﬂect a direct accountability
mechanism whereby local corrupt politicians are removed from oﬃce. Although several
scholars of Italian political history state that Tangentopoli focused on national politi-
cians (Gundle and Parker, 1996; Newell, 2000), they often also mention the involvement
of at least some local politicians. As those were typically elected in bigger municipalities
with direct ties to the national hierarchy of the implicated parties, we replicated our
analysis while dropping all provincial capitals (about 100 municipalities). This leaves
our ﬁndings unaﬀected, as reported in columns (1) to (3) of Table 6.
Nonetheless, to address this potential concern in more detail, we also undertook a
meticulous qualitative analysis of local news over the period 1992-1994. We do this for
two Italian regions – Piemonte in the north and Puglia in the south – which together
represent 18% of the municipalities in our sample. This choice was driven by a need to
include suﬃcient geographical and socio-economic variation, as well as practical concerns
of data availability (as only few local newspapers provide open access to their complete
digital archives). We searched the online archives of La Stampa (for Piemonte) and
La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno (for Puglia) for references to early dissolutions of local
governments, and then examined the articles (about 300 in total, digital copies available
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upon request) for references to politicians charged with corruptive practices.18 The
results indicate that 16 out of 124 cases of early government termination in municipalities
governed by DC/PSI show some evidence of corrupt local politicians. The same is true
for 11 out of 44 cases of early government termination in municipalities governed by other
parties. The results in column (4) through (9) in Table 6 indicate that excluding these
16 municipalities from our estimation sample leaves our ﬁndings qualitatively unaﬀected.
Table 6 about here
4.2. The implosion of DC
Another potential alternative explanation for our ﬁndings might be linked to the
dissolution of DC in January 1994. This indeed implies that politicians in this party
necessarily had to change party, which may provide a partial and ‘mechanical’ explana-
tion for our party switching ﬁndings. However, even though the dissolution of DC (and
PSI) induced an important process of fragmentation in the Italian political landscape,
we are able to track this process because we have information on which parties were the
immediate successors of DC. This allows us to code these parties as if they jointly consti-
tuted DC in the period after 1993. Hence, we can monitor the extent to which politicians
aﬃliated to DC prior to Tangentopoli were aﬃliated to DC-successor parties after 1993
– thus eliminating any purely mechanical eﬀects in our analysis of party switching.
Even so, one might still argue that this fragmentation process directly undermined
politicians’ expected utility from these new DC-successor parties, which might drive our
results above (rather than Tangentopoli as such). Yet, there are a number of elements
18Both newspapers represent a reliable source of local news. Direct links between journalists and local
politicians leading to biased corruption reporting are unlikely. La Stampa, for instance, has a restricted
pool of journalists spread across a few newsrooms in the main cities of Piemonte, who have to cover
news from 1.202 municipalities. Most of the municipalities are quite small (less than 10.000 citizens)
and rarely attract public attention. Moreover, Italian newspapers played a key role during Tangentopoli
in spreading corruption news and the subsequent process of delegitimization of the national political
class. The media coverage was so intense that some politicians were persuaded that admitting their
crimes was better than continuing to be publicly accused by the media (Giglioli, 1996). For instance, in
July 1992, 66% of the ﬁrst pages of the main Italian newspapers covered corruption news (linkiesta.it
22/09/2016).
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that make this alternative explanation less credible. First, the dissolution of DC was
entirely unexpected at least until 23 June 1993, when the Secretary of DC suggested
that “the end of DC would be possible”. This declaration was so unexpected that it
caused complaints from all main DC politicians, which led the Secretary to deny having
made the statement two days later. Even the Pope declared the next day that “DC
doesn’t have to die”. Second, as shown in Figure 4 above, the eﬀect of the scandal on
local government instability already starts in 1992. Clearly, this precedes the dissolution
of DC (in January 1994), which from the discussion above was clearly unpredictable
at that point. Moreover, there is no evidence of a sudden peak in early dissolutions
around June 1993 (as shown in Figure A.2 in the online appendix), which suggests
that the implosion of DC as such had little independent impact on local government
instability.19 Finally, the implosion of DC cannot explain the fact that local government
instability also increased in municipalities with PCI mayors relative to the control group
of municipalities with Civic Party mayors (see above).20
4.3. Alternative speciﬁcations
In our main speciﬁcation, we concentrated on municipalities where the incumbent
mayor is aﬃliated to DC/PSI. Clearly, however, this is only one possible operationaliza-
tion linking the national Tangentopoli scandal to local governments via local politicians’
partisan ties. Here, we consider four alternative scenarios varying in the relative power
of DC/PSI politicians at the local level. First, we look at municipalities where both
the mayor and all aldermen belong to DC/PSI: i.e. municipalities ruled by DC/PSI
without coalition partners (group 1). Second, we analyze cases where the mayor belongs
to DC/PSI, but at least one alderman is aﬃliated to PCI or Civic Parties: municipal-
ities ruled by DC/PSI with at least one coalition partner (group 2). Third, we assess
municipalities where the mayor is from PCI or Civic Parties, but at least one alderman
is aﬃliated to DC/PSI: i.e. DC/PSI is part of the local governing coalition, but does
19While the ﬁgure indicates an increase in local government early dissolutions in the period September-
December 1993, this largely reﬂects a seasonal trend that is visible also in 1992 and partially in 1994.
20Similar arguments also apply to PSI, which was dissolved at the end of a dramatic party convention
on 14 November 1994. As for DC, we can track the immediate successor parties of PSI after 1994.
Moreover, the dissolution of PSI became a possibility only after the heavy electoral defeat in the 1994
elections (Gundle and Parker, 1996). As already shown, our ﬁndings arise already before 1994 (and are
also unaﬀected when omitting 1994 from the sample).
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not control the mayor (group 3). Finally, we look at municipalities where DC/PSI holds
neither the mayor nor any aldermen, and these positions are instead controlled by PCI
or Civic Parties (group 4).
The results of these alternative operationalizations are summarized in Table 7. In col-
umn 1, we compare municipalities where both the mayor and all aldermen are controlled
by DC/PSI (group 1) to all other municipalities (groups 2, 3 and 4) before and after
Tangentopoli. As in the baseline speciﬁcation in the main text, we ﬁnd that municipali-
ties governed solely by DC/PSI document a statistically signiﬁcantly higher probability
of instability once the scandal started. In column 2, we restrict the control group to
cities where DC/PSI rules in a coalition with other parties (thus comparing group 1
to group 2 as deﬁned above). While the municipalities with a more dominant role for
DC/PSI document a weakly higher level of instability after the scandal, the diﬀerence is
not statistically signiﬁcant. In column 3, we shift focus to municipalities with a mayor
from PCI or Civic Parties in a coalition with DC/PSI (group 3) and compare them to
all other municipalities (groups 1, 2 and 4). Again, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect and
the point estimate is even negative, which is reasonable given that the control group in
this case includes municipalities ruled by DC/PSI. Interestingly, however, we ﬁnd a very
strong and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect when restricting the control group in column
4 to municipalities without DC/PSI in the governing coalition (eﬀectively comparing
groups 3 and 4 deﬁned above). The latter result would be consistent with the party in
control of the mayor triggering early elections to distance itself from DC/PSI, thereby
also capitalizing on those parties’ sudden weakness to strengthen its own position.
Overall, we can summarize these ﬁndings as follows. The highest level of local govern-
ment instability is observed following Tangentopoli for municipalities where the mayor is
from DC/PSI - whether or not these parties maintain a coalition government with other
parties (i.e. groups 1 and 2). Then, among municipalities where the mayor is from PCI
or Civic Parties, local government instability after the scandal is higher where DC/PSI
is part of the coalition (group 3) compared to where it is not (group 4). These results
closely conﬁrm those presented in the main text. In line with our theoretical argument
concerning the role of the party “brand”, they also highlight that the presence of DC/PSI
in the local governing coalition is central to the observed increase in local government
instability after the eruption of the scandal.
Finally, we also implemented two further tests. On the one hand, we experimented
with an alternative speciﬁcation of our dependent variable: i.e. 1 if the dissolution of
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the local council was due to the resignation of a majority of local councillors, 0 otherwise
(based on oﬃcial data from the Italian Ministry of Interior). This leaves our ﬁndings
qualitatively unaﬀected. Yet, the coeﬃcient estimates decline in size, which strongly
suggest that ignoring other oﬃcially stated reasons for dissolution appears unwarranted.
In reality, almost every early termination is ﬁnally due to a disagreement among local
politicians. On the other hand, Table A.5 in the appendix evaluates the robustness of
our main ﬁndings on political instability to the introduction of year-region ﬁxed eﬀects.
This is a very restrictive speciﬁcation as it controls for time-varying local shocks. Again,
our main results are unaﬀected.21
5. Conclusions
A substantial academic literature has found strong and consistent evidence that voters
are willing and able to punish corrupt incumbents on Election Day (Ferraz and Finan,
2008; Nannicini et al., 2013; Chong et al., 2014; Cavalcanti et al., 2016). Yet, little is
known about how politicians – rather than voters – react to such scandals. Evidently,
corruption scandals will have an important impact on the implicated politicians’ careers.
The central contribution of our analysis, however, is to show that political scandals
can have substantial implications also beyond the politicians directly involved because
they may tarnish the party “brand” (Lupu, 2014). That is, since large-scale corruption
scandals trigger explicit negative labelling of the involved party (or parties) by the media,
they generate a negative societal perception of this party. Studies of organizational
stigma show that such negative views often become “extended to individuals linked to,
or aﬃliated with, the stigmatized social actor (e.g., company directors involved in a
bankruptcy)” (Kvale and Murdoch, 2017, p.6). Rational politicians then will reassess
the costs and beneﬁts of their aﬃliation with a party involved in a corruption scandal,
even when – or, possibly, particularly when – they are not themselves implicated by
the scandal. We test the empirical implications of this line of argument by exploiting
21We also considered exploring the impact of Tangentopoli on an additional dimension of local gov-
ernance: namely, public ﬁnances. Unfortunately, oﬃcial statistics obtained from the Italian Ministry
of Interior are highly incomplete for our period of interest, such that systematic information on total
expenditures, revenues or intergovernmental transfers is only available for some municipalities. Further-
more, local government revenue and expenditure assignments were changed substantially in the early
nineties, which further complicates any inferences drawn from the available ﬁscal data.
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the main corruption scandal in Italian recent history (Tangentopoli), which took place in
the period 1992-1994 and mostly involved the two leading national parties (the Christian
Democratic DC and the Italian Socialist Party PSI).
Our analysis illustrates that a prominent political scandal at the national level causes
an increase in government instability at the local level, especially in municipalities where
the mayor is aﬃliated to a party involved in the corruption scandal. This eﬀect is stronger
in regions where more national-level politicians are charged with corruption, and persists
even when we exclude municipalities where local politicians might be implicated by Tan-
gentopoli. We also show that mayors aﬃliated to the parties implicated in the scandal
are less likely to stand for reelection, and more likely to switch party when they do stand
for reelection (which is found to mitigate the electoral retribution faced by politicians of
the tainted party). Such party switching is also observed for DC/PSI councillors more
generally. Taken together, these results indicate that local politicians not themselves
involved in the scandal re-optimize their behavior relative to the implicated parties by
leaving the party, leaving politics, or withdrawing support from the ruling coalition –
which subsequently becomes reﬂected in increased local government instability. This at-
tests to the strong relevance of party “brands” in contemporary politics, and particularly
highlights a potential ‘dark side’ of politicians’ partisan attachment. Indeed, party labels
may cause corruption scandals to spill over across politicians and levels of government.
Finally, our results imply that government instability might in our setting be seen
as the result of individual-level – rather than collective – decision-making processes.
That is, early termination of local governments arises as an externality of individual
politicians’ strategic decisions with respect to their partisan aﬃliation (or association
in case of coalition partners) – rather than as the outcome of a collective strategy to
bring down the government. Given the importance of political instability for economic
development (Alesina et al., 1996), these short-term strategic calculations may have long-
term implications. We consider the further assessment of such externalities an important
avenue for further research.
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Figure 1: Mayors’ party aﬃliation in 1991
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Figure 2: Charged National Politicians by year and party
Notes: This ﬁgure reports the number of national politicians charged with corruption (or corruption-related oﬀences) by
year and politicians’ party aﬃliation. Own calculations based on data from Ceron and Mainenti (2015).
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Notes: This ﬁgure reports the share of municipalities experiencing early government dissolution by year and the mayor’s
party aﬃliation.
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Notes: This ﬁgure presents the results of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model where
local government instability – operationalized as early government dissolution – is
the dependent variable. The central independent variables are a set of interaction
terms between DC/PSI and a set of indicator variables for each year in our
observation period (except 1991, which is employed as the reference category).
The coeﬃcient estimates of these interaction terms are depicted here, with 90%
and 95% conﬁdence intervals. The top panel employs municipalities with PCI
mayors as the control group, while the bottom panel employs municipalities with
Civic Party mayors as the control group.
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Notes: This ﬁgure presents the results of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model. The
dependent variable is being reelected in the top panel while switching party
(conditional on being reelected) in the bottom panel. The central independent
variables are a set of interaction terms between DC/PSI and a set of indicator
variables for each year in our observation period (except 1991, which is employed
as the reference category). The coeﬃcient estimates of these interaction terms
are depicted here, with 90% and 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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Figure 6: Party switching by local DC/PSI politicians
Notes: This ﬁgure depicts the share of DC/PSI politicians elected at the local level that switched to other parties in the
1991, 1993 or 1995 local elections. The left-hand side of each panel – ‘party of origin’ – is always 100% as we look at the
complete set of politicians elected in year t aﬃliated to DC/PSI (or its successors) in the period immediately preceding the
election. The right-hand side of each panel – ‘party of destination’ – indicates the parties for which this set of politicians
is elected in year t.
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Table 1: National political scandals and local government crises
Control group
PCI/Other parties PCI Other parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DC/PSI X After Scandal 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
PCI X After Scandal 0.007**
(0.003)
DC/PSI 0.003** -0.001 0.008 -0.008
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
PCI 0.018
(0.013)
After Scandal 0.001 0.014*** 0.006 0.005 0.011
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
R2 0.001 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.093
N municipalities 8,099 8,099 7,423 7,022 3,171
N observations 43,990 43,990 37,636 36,299 14,040
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of election FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable Instability is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the government in municipality
i experiences early termination in year t, 0 otherwise. DC/PSI is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the mayor
of a municipality is aﬃliated to either the Christian Democrats (DC) or the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), while
PCI is a dummy equal to 1 when the mayor of a municipality is aﬃliated the Italian Communist Party. The
variable After Scandal is equal to 1 for the period 1992-1994 and 0 for the period 1989-1991. In columns (1) and
(2) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated to either Other parties (Civic
parties and minor parties) or PCI. In column (3) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a
mayor aﬃliated with PCI, while in columns (4) and (5) the control group is composed of municipalities governed
by a mayor aﬃliated with Other parties. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Local government instability and level of corruption
Number of corrupt politicians Share of corrupt politicians
PCI/Other parties PCI Other parties PCI/Other parties PCI Other parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC/PSI X After scandal X High corruption 0.008** 0.001 0.017*** 0.003 -0.001 0.008*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
DC/PSI X After scandal 0.013*** 0.009** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.009** 0.020***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
DC/PSI X High corruption 0.014 0.035 -0.006 0.004 0.020 -0.011
(0.020) (0.034) (0.025) (0.020) (0.033) (0.024)
After scandal X High corruption 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.005 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
After scandal -0.032*** -0.042*** -0.045*** -0.033*** -0.042*** -0.047***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
DC/PSI -0.000 0.005 -0.005 0.003 0.010 -0.002
(0.011) (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.022) (0.014)
R2 0.139 0.157 0.144 0.139 0.156 0.144
N municipalities 8,099 7,423 7,022 8,099 7,423 7,022
N observations 43,990 37,636 36,299 43,990 37,636 36,299
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of election FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable Instability is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the government in municipality i experiences early termination in year t, 0 otherwise. DC/PSI is a dummy variable
equal to 1 when the mayor of a municipality is aﬃliated to either the Christian Democrats (DC) or the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), while PCI is a dummy equal to 1 when the mayor of a municipality
is aﬃliated the Italian Communist Party. The variable After Scandal is equal to 1 for the period 1992-1994 and 0 for the period 1989-1991. In columns (1), (2) and (3) High corruption takes value 1
for municipalities belonging to electoral districts where the number of national politicians charged with corruption is above the median of the sample distribution. In columns (4), (5) and (6) High
corruption instead equals 1 for municipalities belonging to electoral districts where the share of national politicians charged with corruption is above the median of the sample distribution. In columns
(1) and (4) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated to either Other parties (Civic parties and minor parties) or PCI. In columns (2) and (5) the control group
is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated to PCI, while in columns (3) and (6) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated to Other parties.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Local government instability and political competition
Party system fragmentation Electoral competition
PCI/Other parties PCI Other parties PCI/Other parties PCI Other parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC/PSI X After scandal X High fragmentation 0.010** 0.012** 0.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
DC/PSI X After scandal X High competition 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.028***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
DC/PSI X High fragmentation -0.002 -0.004 -0.010
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
After scandal X High fragmentation 0.011*** 0.008 0.010
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
High fragmentation -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
After scandal X High competition 0.005 0.007** 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
DC/PSI X After scandal 0.004 0.001 0.005** 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
DC/PSI -0.001 0.007 -0.005 -0.005 0.002 -0.013***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
After scandal 0.009* 0.002 0.002 0.009* -0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
R2 0.013 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.018
N municipalities 8,099 7,417 7,022 8,099 7,423 7,022
N observations 43,926 37,575 36,240 43,990 37,636 36,299
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of election FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable Instability is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the government in municipality i experiences early termination in year t, 0 otherwise. DC/PSI is a dummy variable equal
to 1 when the mayor of a municipality is aﬃliated to either the Christian Democrats (DC) or the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), while PCI is a dummy equal to 1 when the mayor of a municipality is
aﬃliated the Italian Communist Party. The variable After Scandal is equal to 1 for the period 1992-1994 and 0 for the period 1989-1991. High fragmentation takes value 1 for municipalities where the
number of parties in the city council is above the median of the sample distribution. High competition equals 1 for municipalities that experienced at least one change in the party of the mayor in the
period 1985-1991. In columns (1) and (4) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated to either Other parties (Civic parties and minor parties) or PCI. In columns (2)
and (5) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated to PCI, while in columns (3) and (6) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated
to Other parties. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Mayors’ probability of standing for reelection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DC/PSI -0.0863*** -0.0765***
(0.00946) (0.00954)
Other parties (civic parties) 0.0905*** 0.0964***
(0.0140) (0.0140)
R2 0.055 0.067 0.051 0.066
N observations 10,519 10,491 10,519 10,491
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual covariates No Yes No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable Standing equals 1 when a mayor elected prior to 1992 is standing for re-election
in the period 1993-1995, 0 otherwise. DC/PSI is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a mayoral candidate was
aﬃliated (before 1992) to either the Christian Democrats or the Italian Socialist Party, while Other parties is
a dummy equal to 1 when a mayoral candidate was aﬃliated with either a Civic party or other minor parties.
Individual covariates include gender, education and year of birth. Robust standard errors in parenthesis * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Mayor’s probability of reelection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC/PSI -0.119*** -0.102*** -0.171*** -0.145***
(0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0246) (0.0244)
Other parties (civic parties) 0.0372* 0.0494**
(0.0206) (0.0204)
Other parties (civic parties)t+1 -0.0245 -0.0197
(0.0241) (0.0236)
DC/PSI X Other parties (civic parties)t+1 0.0958*** 0.0790**
(0.0314) (0.0310)
R-squared 0.039 0.066 0.006 0.041 0.044 0.069
Observations 2,996 2,991 2,996 2,991 2,996 2,991
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable Elected equals 1 for the politician that won the mayoral election, 0 for those candidates that failed to win the election.
DC/PSI is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a mayoral candidate was aﬃliated before 1992 to either the Christian Democrats or the Italian Socialist Party,
while Other parties is a dummy equal to 1 when a mayoral candidate was aﬃliated to either a Civic party or other minor parties. Other partiest+1 equals 1
when a candidate is running as a candidate for a Civic party or other minor parties in the current election. Individual covariates include gender, education














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Robustness check coalition composition
Group 1 Vs. Group 3 Vs.
Groups Group Groups Group
2, 3 and 4 2 1, 2 and 4 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DC/PSI (mayor and all aldermen) X After Scandal 0.005** 0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
PCI/Other parties (at least 1 alderman from DC/PSI) X After Scandal -0.000 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
DC/PSI (mayor and all aldermen) 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.005)
PCI/Other parties (at least 1 alderman from DC/PSI) 0.002 -0.003
(0.004) (0.007)
After Scandal 0.017*** 0.013** 0.019*** 0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
R2 0.011 0.015 0.010 0.093
N municipalities 8,099 6,230 8,099 3,171
N observations 43,990 29,950 43,990 14,040
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of election FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable Instability is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the government in municipality i experiences early termination in year t, 0 otherwise.
DC/PSI (mayor and all aldermen) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for municipalities that have both the mayor and all aldermen from DC/PSI (i.e., group 1). The
variable PCI/Other parties (at least 1 alderman from DC/PSI) is equal to 1 when a municipality is governed by a mayor from either PCI or Other parties (Civic
parties and minor parties) but at least one alderman is aﬃliated with DC/PSI (i.e., group 3). The variable After Scandal is equal to 1 for the period 1992-1994 and
0 for the period 1989-1991. In column (1) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor from PCI or Other parties (i.e., groups 3 and 4) and
municipalities governed by a mayor from DC/PSI but where at least one aldermen is from PCI or Other parties (i.e., group 2). In column (2) the control group is
composed only by municipalities from group 2. In column (3) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor from DC/PSI (i.e., groups 1 and
2) and municipalities governed by a mayor from PCI or Other parties but where there are no aldermen from DC/PSI (i.e., group 4). In column (4) the control group
is composed only by municipalities from group 4. Finally, in columns (1) and (3) the whole sample is considered. Instead, the analysis is limited to municipalities
governed by a mayor from DC/PSI, in column (2), and PCI/Other parties in column (4). Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Online Appendix A. Summary statistics and additional results
Figure A.1: Party switching by local DC/PSI, PCI and Civic Party politicians
Notes: This ﬁgure depicts the share of local politicians aﬃliated to DC/PSI, PCI or Other parties elected that switched
to other parties in the 1991, 1993 or 1995 local elections. The left-hand side of each panel – ‘party of origin’ – is always
100% as we look at the complete set of politicians elected in year t aﬃliated to a given party in the period immediately
preceding the election. The right-hand side of each panel – ‘party of destination’ – indicates the parties for which this set
of politicians is elected in year t.
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Figure A.2: Monthly number of local government early dissolutions (only DC)
Notes: This ﬁgure shows the monthly data for the number of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated to DC that
witness the early dissolution of its government.
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Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Municipalities (1989-1994)
Instability 0.011 0.106 0 1 43990
DC/PSI 0.681 0.466 0 1 43990
DC 0.515 0.5 0 1 43990
PSI 0.137 0.344 0 1 43990
PCI 0.175 0.38 0 1 43990
Other parties (civic parties) 0.144 0.352 0 1 43990
DC/PSI (mayor and all aldermen) 0.417 0.493 0 1 43990
PCI/Other parties (at least 1 alderman from DC/PSI) 0.166 0.372 0 1 43990
Province capital 0.01 0.101 0 1 43990
High competition 0.515 0.269 0 1 43990
Num. of corrupt politicians (above the median) 0.395 0.489 0 1 43990
Share of corrupt politicians (above the median) 0.472 0.499 0 1 43990
Num. of parties in the city council (above the median) 0.412 0.492 0 1 43926
All local oﬃcials (1989-1995)
Elected 0.514 0.5 0 1 516,547
DC/PSI - Successors 0.513 0.5 0 1 516,547
Switching 0.317 0.465 0 1 92,257
Mayoral candidates (1993-1995)
Re-run 0.285 0.451 0 1 10,519
Elected 0.755 0.43 0 1 2,996
DC/PSI - Successors 0.697 0.46 0 1 10,519
Other parties (civic parties) 0.12 0.325 0 1 10,519
Year of birth 1,944.679 9.890 1907 1972 10,517
Gender (male) 0.962 0.192 0 1 10,519
Education (graduated) 0.371 0.483 0 1 10,491
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Table A.2: Local government early dissolution by year and party
Year DC/PSI PCI Other parties TOTAL
1989 0.8% (5,567) 0.3% (1,422) 0.3% (887) 0.7% (8,081)
1990 0.5% (5,573) 0.4% (1,401) 0.9% (914) 0.5% (8,099)
1991 1.6% (5,556) 1.0% (1,394) 1.5% (917) 1.5% (8,078)
1992 1.8% (5,378) 1.3% (1,366) 0.8% (891) 1.5% (7,844)
1993 2.5% (4,184) 1.5% (1,096) 1.0% (780) 2.0% (6,256)
1994 0.6% (3,692) 0.1% (1,012) 0.3% (738) 0.5% (5,632)
TOTAL 1.3% (29,950 ) 0.8% (7,691) 0.8% (5,127) 1.8% (43,990)
Notes: This table reports the share of municipalities experiencing an early dissolution of its government
by year and the mayor’s party aﬃliation. The number of municipalities included in each sample is
reported in parenthesis.
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Table A.3: Pre-trends and eﬀect development
PCI/Other parties PCI Other parties
(1) (2) (3)
DC/PSI X Scandalt−3 0.001 -0.003 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
DC/PSI X Scandalt−2 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
DC/PSI X Scandalt 0.004 -0.001 0.010**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
DC/PSI X Scandalt+1 0.010** 0.005 0.016***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
DC/PSI X Scandalt+2 0.005* 0.003 0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
DC/PSI -0.001 0.010 -0.011
(0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
R2 0.011 0.013 0.014
N municipalities 8,099 7,423 7,022
N observations 43,990 37,636 36,299
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes:The dependent variable Instability is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the government in
municipality i experiences early termination in year t, 0 otherwise. DC/PSI is a dummy variable
equal to 1 when the mayor of a municipality is aﬃliated to either the Christian Democrats (DC)
or the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), while PCI is a dummy equal to 1 when the mayor of a
municipality is aﬃliated the Italian Communist Party. Scandal is a set of indicator variables
for each year in our observation period (where t = 1992). In column (1) the control group is
composed of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated to either Other parties (Civic parties
and minor parties) or PCI. In column (2) the control group is composed of municipalities governed
by a mayor aﬃliated to PCI, while in column (3) the control group is composed of municipalities
governed by a mayor aﬃliated to Other parties. Standard errors clustered at the municipality
level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: National political scandals and local government crises – eﬀects by party
Control group
PCI/Other parties PCI Other parties PCI/Other parties PCI Other parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC X After Scandal 0.008*** 0.006** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
PSI X After Scandal 0.005 0.003 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
DC 0.002 0.012 -0.007
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005)
PSI -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
After Scandal 0.008* 0.008* 0.010** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
R2 0.022 0.027 0.024 0.049 0.052 0.054
N municipalities 7,218 6,540 5,937 4,362 3,310 2,924
N observations 36,685 31,558 28,999 20,092 14,965 12,401
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of election FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable Instability is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the government in municipality i experiences early termination in year t, 0
otherwise. DC/PSI is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the mayor of a municipality is aﬃliated to either the Christian Democrats (DC) or the Italian Socialist
Party (PSI), while PCI is a dummy equal to 1 when the mayor of a municipality is aﬃliated the Italian Communist Party. The variable After Scandal is equal to
1 for the period 1992-1994 and 0 for the period 1989-1991. In columns (1) and (4) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated
to either Other parties (Civic parties and minor parties) or PCI. In columns (2) and (5) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor
aﬃliated to PCI, while in columns (3) and (6) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated to Other parties. Standard errors
clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
46
Table A.5: Robustness checks region-year ﬁxed eﬀects
PCI/Other parties PCI Other parties
(1) (2) (3)
DC/PSI X After scandal 0.003 0.001 0.006**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
After scandal 0.003 0.009 -0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
DC/PSI -0.000 0.008 -0.007
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
R2 0.024 0.027 0.028
N municipalities 8,099 7,423 7,022
N observations 43,990 37,636 36,299
Year FE No No No
Region X Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Year of election FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable Instability is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the government in
municipality i experiences early termination in year t, 0 otherwise. DC/PSI is a dummy variable
equal to 1 when the mayor of a municipality is aﬃliated to either the Christian Democrats (DC) or
the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). The variable After Scandal is equal to 1 for the period 1992-1994 and
0 for the period 1989-1991. In column (1) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by
a mayor aﬃliated to either Other parties (Civic parties and minor parties) or PCI. In column (2) the
control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated to PCI, while in column
(3) the control group is composed of municipalities governed by a mayor aﬃliated to Other parties.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p <
0.01.
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Table A.6: Election and Party switching
Election Switching
(1) (2)
DC/PSI X Scandalt−3 0.036 0.076
(0.036) (0.055)
DC/PSI X Scandalt−2 -0.017 0.022
(0.027) (0.047)
DC/PSI X Scandalt -0.068** 0.128**
(0.032) (0.055)
DC/PSI X Scandalt+1 -0.119*** 0.203***
(0.027) (0.049)
DC/PSI X Scandalt+2 -0.126*** 0.798***
(0.027) (0.050)





N municipalities 8,096 7,996
N observations 346,841 92,257
Year FE Yes Yes
Notes: In column (1) the dependent variable is elected, which is
equal to 1 if an incumbent politician was re-elected in the follow-
ing term (0 otherwise). In column (2) the dependent variable is
switching, which equals 1 for an incumbent politician that was re-
elected in the following term in diﬀerent party (0 otherwise). The
sample here is restricted to those politician re-elected. DC/PSI is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if a politicians candidate was aﬃliated
in the previous election to either the Christian Democrats or the
Italian Socialist Party. Scandal is a set of indicator variables for
each year in our observation period (where t = 1992). Standard
errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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